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Abstract. We propose a U-shaped relation between the relative weight of bank loans  in total 
corporate  debt and  the firm's  market-to-book ratio-a proxy  for  expected growth-which 
reconciles most existing theories. Using data on Japanese firms for 1983-97, we do find that, in 
the lower range of growth spectrum, firms with better prospects take more bonds in their debt 
mix:  when the firm's prospects improve, the benefits from private debt initially fall relative to its 
costs.  In contrast, in the higher range of growth, firms  with more growth potentials take more 
monitored debt, reflecting, amongst other factors, the higher information and contracting costs of 
public debt faced by  extreme growers. We can explain the seemingly conflicting evidence that 
Anderson and Makhija (1999) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) provide in this respect. 
We also find that keiretsu firms do  not behave significantly different from non-keiretsu ones, 
suggesting that keiretsu firms are fairly independent in their financing decisions and that extra 
costs and benefits from  bank loans are either small or in reasonable balance. Firms that faced 
restrictions in issuing bonds, pre-1990, continue to behave differently from other firms long after 
the restrictions were lifted. 
Key words: Bank Loan, Monitoring, Outside Debt, Debt Choice, Growth. 
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1. Introduction 
A  non-trivial  aspect  of a  corporation's  capital-structure  policy is  the  choice between 
monitored debt-primarily bank loans-and arm's-length debt (most bonds). On the basis of 
considerations  of information asymmetries  and  conflicts  of interest,  Diamond  (1991) 
proposes a negative relation between the relative use of  bank debt and the borrower's quality 
and prospects (usually measured by the market-to-book ratio, a proxy for the market's degree 
of  confidence in the firm). Empirical work for Japan (and elsewhere), however, has produced 
mixed results. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993), using 1992 Japanese debt-structure 
data, do find the predicted negative association among keiretsu-affiliated firms.  In contrast, 
when Anderson and Makhija (1999) study similar data from the early 1990s, they observe a 
positive relationship, in particular for firms that face restrictions on public bond issuing. The 
purpose of this paper is dual. At the theory level, we argue that there are plausible grounds 
indeed for a positive association, but mainly towards the high end of the market-to-book 
spectrum. That is, we conjecture that there may be a U-shaped relation. At the emprirical 
level, we convincingly document the existence of  such a relation and we track the source of  the 
contradictions in the above empirical work on Japan. 
We find that, most of the time, most of the firms turn out to  be on the negatively-
sloped part (as the Diamond argument predicts). Only around the time of  peaking stock prices 
is there a brief  interlude where almost half  of  the firms are on the positive-sloping section. But 
as the right tail ofthe distribution of  book-to-market is much more spread out, this half of  the 
1990-92 sample dominates the sample if one runs a purely linear regression. In short, while 
for some of  the firms and some of  the time there is, empirically, a predominantly positive link, 
this early-90s phenomenon is not really representative. In fact, we find that once one adds 
market-to-book squared, the U-shape is quite manifest in all subperiods. We also find that the 
firms in the positively sloped domain of the U-shape are not those that, until  1990, faced 
regulatory restrictions  in tapping the public-bond market, the  subgroup  emphasized by 
Anderson and Makhija (1999). For those firms, the relation between the loan ratio and growth 
is rather unclear; and, interestingly, they continue to behave differently from others long after 
the restriction is lifted. By contrast, we find no evidence whatsoever that keiretsu firms did 
behave differently from non-keiretsu firms as far as the loan-ratio/market-to-book relationship 
is concerned. This fmding suggests that keiretsu members were still fairly independent in their 
fmancing decisions and that their main banks' rent-extraction behavior (if  any) was reasonably 
commensurate with the benefits (if any) that banks provide. Debt mix and growth in Japan  2 
In Section 2, we review the arguments for a positive or negative relationship between 
the bank loan ratio and market-to-book. Section 3 motivates the test design and the choice of 
Japan as the testing ground. A description and qualitative discussion of the data follows in 
Section 4, and the regression output in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The choice of private v. public debt and corporate growth: the hypotheses 
We  first review the hypotheses in the extant literature that support either a positive or a 
negative relation between the debt mix choice and growth (subsection 2.1). Then, we propose 
a non-linear hypothesis that reconciles the existing theories (subsection 2.2). 
2.1. General pros and cons of private debt (bank debt) 
To a large extent, the issue whether to use monitored bank loans or arm's-length bonds arises 
from a combination of conflicts of interests (stockholders v.  bondholders) and information 
asymmetries  (firm  v.  market).  These  asymmetries  lead to agency  costs,  such as  asset 
substitution  or  under-investment  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976;  Myers,  1977).  The 
asymmetries also mean that financing in the market entails high information costs (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). The advantage, in this respect, of  using monitored or bank debt has been well 
understood in the literature: bank loans help mitigate a firm's agency problems because banks 
can monitor and control the client firms,  while individual bondholders have no incentive to 
monitor due to a free-riding problem.! In addition, a bank is often better informed than other 
potential lenders in the first place, because firms are often prepared to reveal, during private 
negotiations, proprietary information that they would balk at divulging to the general public 
(Campbell, 1979, and Yosha,  1995). Lastly, if the borrower's luck turns, bank loans are 
renegotiable. In contrast, public debt all  too often imposes inflexible constraints, leaving 
inefficient liquidation as  the only exit (see also Detragiache, 1994,  and Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri,1994). 
The efficiency gains that result from adopting bank debt rather than bonds can be 
shared between lender and borrower. But also uninformed third parties may benefit. The 
market, many argue, realizes that a history of  bank/frrm interaction and monitoring provides 
banks with an information advantage over other lenders (Fama, 1985): the house bank tends to 
be "inside" while arm's-length lenders typically remain "outside". A bank's seal of  approval 
therefore  signals  information  (Leland  and  Pyle,  1977;  Campbell  and  Kracaw,  1980). 
Consistent with this view,  empirical studies find  that the  market views banks'  lending 
'Bank loans are concentrated in  a few lenders while bonds, being public debt, are generally diffusely held. 
Although bond covenants can mitigate agency problems associated with financing with bonds (see Smith and 
Warner,  1979), this difference still  gives  rise to  higher agency  costs of public debt relative to close-held 
monitored debt (see, e.g. Diamond, 1984; Berlin and Loeys, 1988, among others). Debt mix and growth in Japan  3 
decisions in a positive light. For example, James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) 
find that stock price responses to the announcements of bank-loan agreements and renewals 
are significantly positive. Such signaling, in turn, can lower the information and contracting 
costs in that it relieves other fund providers from similar costly evaluations (Easterbrook, 
1984; Fama, 1985). 
Other authors are  less  optimistic about such externality effects.  To  a  lender,  the 
information from a bank's willingness to fund is unambiguously positive only if  the bank debt 
is junior to the other lender's. If  that is not the case, the bank's decision to lend still leaves 
many uncertainties, and its private information is not easily inferred by third parties. Nor are 
banks motivated to divulge such information: to the contrary, as it takes time and effort to 
switch banks and rebuild a new relationship, firms  are, to  some extent, hostages to their 
existing bank relation. Thus, by virtue of  their information monopoly and the relation-specific 
assets, Sharpe (1990) argues, banks may use their information-monopoly power over client 
firms to "hold up" firms and extract rent, ex post. Rajan (1992) further suggests that, given 
this holdup behavior of banks, firms may, ex ante, reduce their incentives to exert effort if 
they expect to receive too small a share of  the future rent. To test this conjecture, one can use 
the logic that hold-up behavior, if any, should be most prevalent when there is  no  ex post 
competition (von Thadden,  1992)-for example when firms  do not have multiple  bank 
relations.2  Houston  and  James  (1996)  empirically  investigate  the  effect  of the 
presence/absence of multiple banking relations and find evidence consistent with Rajan's 
hypothesis. Specifically, a U.S. firm that maintains borrowing relations with just one single 
bank typically takes on less bank loans in their debt mix, the better its market-to-book value 
ratio. This is in marked contrast to firms that deal with many banks: these even take on more 
bank loans  when they have  relatively  higher market values.  Thus,  it does  look as  if, 
unchecked, banks may impose important costs onto their customers. 
2.2. The Case for a U-sbaped Relation between loan and growth 
The existence of hold-up costs can explain why, in any given cross-section, some firms do 
prefer public debt to bank debt, notably when the benefits of  monitoring are below the hold-
up costs.3 As argued by Diamond (1991), also for any given firm the demand for monitored 
2This is,  however, not an all-or-nothing situation.  Sharpe (1990) argues that even with ex post competition 
hold-up behavior can occur-again, this is related to whether or not information collected during the relation can 
be easily transferred to other lenders. On the other hand, there can be mitigating factors other than competition, 
such as loan commitments provided by inside banks and backed by their reputational capital (Boot, Greenbaum 
and Thakor, 1993). 
'Even the very existence of benefits from relationship banking is sometimes questioned. Carey, Post and Sharpe 
(1998) investigate the determinants of the private debt mix (bank debt versus other private debt) and find that 
banks do  not differ from other private lenders in providing finance to companies with large information 
problems. For example, banks tend to abstain from financing firms tbat are observationally riskier, probably for 
reasons of bank liability and reputation. Kroszner and Strahan (200 I) find that banks do not have a seat on the Debt mix and growth in Japan  4 
debt is changing over time with the firm's reputation in the market and, to some extent, the 
degree of asymmetric information it faces. In fact, the very use of  costly monitoring through 
bank  loans4  eventually works  against  the  use  of bank  loans.  Specifically,  by keeping 
borrowers from undertaking injudicious investments and by certifying their confidence in 
these firms, banks improve their customers' growth prospects and reputation in the market 
and therefore, unintentionally, enable them to gradually switch towards cheaper unmonitored, 
public debt. 
This line of  reasoning predicts that, the higher and the more reliable the firm's growth 
prospects, the less it will resort to bank loans. Accordingly, the empirical literature typically 
tries to relate the loans-to-debt ratio (that is, bank debt over the sum of  bank debt and bonds) 
to the firm's market-to-book (MtB) value ratio. This ratio, also called the value-to-cost ratio, 
is  typically interpreted as  measuring the relative importance of the firm's  growth-related 
intangible assets (see, for instance, Smith and Watts,  1992)-an amalgam of management's 
ability to add value, the earnings potential or quality of  assets in place, the firm's likely future 
investment opportunities, and reliability (low risk). In the literature, the variable is firmly 
called "growth", even though it also contains normalized return on investment (assets) and the 
risk premium.5 As we have some indications that the other factors may have to some extent 
obscured the relation, we prefer to call it just the market-to-book ratio or MtB. 
For U.S. firms, it turns out, the relation between debt mix and MtB  is inconclusive 
(see, for instance, Johnson, 1997). So is the extant Japanese evidence. For instance, Anderson 
and Makhija (1999) fmd that higher-MtB firms borrowed more from banks, both before and 
right after the 1990 generalization of  access to bond markets; they infer that Japanese bank 
loans provide monitoring benefits without imposing meaningful holdup costs. But from a 
similar study, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharf  stein (1993) conclude that for keiretsu firms the 
relationship is negative, suggesting that for these firms there are significant holdup costs. 
Diamond's (1991) negative relation between the use of monitored debt and firms' 
market-to-book ratio is to a large extent associated with better growth prospects and/or lower 
risks as fmancing becomes easier: the young (or restructuring) firm gets promoted to a higher 
market-to-book class  as  it is  able  to  reduce  skepticism among investors  and (re)build 
reputation. But this particular life cycle may not apply in all cases. Some young firms may 
start off with unusually good growth prospects (relative to risk) and, therefore, high initial 
value-to-cost ratios. In such a sample, the life cycle is primarily one of growth that falls 
relative to the cost of  capital as the firm gradually exercises its investment options. There are 
boards of firms that could become financially distressed, which they interpret as a result of the bank liability 
regulation. 
~ollowing  Rajan (1992), we enlarge the notion of "monitoring cost" so as to cover also rent extraction. 
5The Gordon-Shapiro model predicts that MtB = Et(ROIt+1)/(~+RP-g), where ROI denotes cash flow over book 
value of assets, Rfthe risk-free rate, RP the risk premium, and g the (perpetual) growth rate of cash flows. Debt mix and growth in Japan  5 
many arguments in the literature suggesting that, towards the highest end of the market-to-
book spectrum, the relation between bank debt and growth may turn positive: (i) Firms with 
high market-to-book ratios also tend to face large uncertainties as adverse macroeconomic or 
sector-specific  shocks  can  drastically  reduce  the  value  of the  hoped-for  investment 
opportunities. These large uncertainties mean high credit risks and high information costs 
when raising public debt, problems that are better solved via "inside" bank relations.6 (ii) As 
argued in the introduction, public debt is inflexible, which makes it costly and inefficient in the 
event of  financial distress-a threat that is of special relevance to high-growth firms (Berlin 
and Mester, 1991). (iii) High growth tends to  be associated with proprietary information 
which firms are loth to share with the general public but can divulge in private (Yosha, 1995). 
(iv) As Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990) argue, bank loans are preferred over public debt when 
the firm has management skills but no credit reputation, a description that is again rather likely 
to fit a young, high-growth firm. (v) Bank loans are largely short-term debt while bonds are 
mostly long-term debt; and,  as Barclay and Smith (1996) point out, empirically firms with 
more investment opportunities use significantly more short-term debt than long term debt. 
On balance, then, we posit a U-shaped relation between the debt source choice and 
the value and cost ratio. Figure 1 illustrates this. At the lower end of market-to-book ratio 
spectrum, firms are of low quality with poor growth prospects, while at the high-market-to-
book end we  find  high-growth firms  with severe information asymmetries and no  credit 
reputations, who value the flexibility and comparative confidentiality associated with bank 
loans. Both groups mainly rely on bank borrowing, but for different reasons. The low-growth 
firms need monitored debt for the purpose of  reducing agency problems (such as verifying the 
quality of the  investments)  and  (re)building a  reputation,  while  the  latter can  better 
communicate  with  inside  banks  and  count on them  for  information  processing  and 
dissemination. Toward the middle of market-to-book ratio spectrum, in contrast, firms have 
good (and reassuringly unexceptional) growth prospects and "normal" risks, which makes 
them less vulnerable to information or credibility gaps and, therefore, more likely to rely on 
public debt.? 
6True, this does  not necessarily mean high-growth firms are entirely shut out from the public-debt markets. 
Stein (1992), for instance, suggests that convertible bonds provide a way for high-growth firms to mitigate an 
information gap. Still, such asymmetries remain a serious obstacle to straight-bond borrowing. 
7Hoshi, Kashyap and Schafstein (1993) also suggests a non-linear relation between the debt mix choice and 
firm's growth but with an inverted U-shaped curve; they predict that firms at the two extremes of  value-to-cost 
ratios take more public debt and in the middle more bank loans.  However, they could not find  supporting 
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3. Test Design 
In this section we  motivate our main testing procedure. First we briefly describe the data 
(subsection 3.1), and then discuss  four reasons  why the  Japanese  experience should  be 
particularly interesting for  our purpose (subsection 3.2).  We  also  introduce  the control 
variables (subsection 3.3). Lastly, we discuss regression specifications (subsection 3.4). 
3.1. The Data 
We retrieve our Japanese data from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) databases. The 
annual data on balance sheets and income statements cover two decades, 1977-97. We select 
all listed firms excluding the financial, utilities, and (heavily regulated) transportation and 
communication sectors. To qualifY for inclusion, the fum should have 20 years of  non-missing 
data8 on (i) book value of short-term bank loans (data items JAF33, 34), long-term bank: loans 
(JAF48)  and  bonds outstanding (JAF49,  50,  51);  (ii) book equity (BAL21),  and  (iii) market 
equity (MKT3 ¥ MKT5-stock price times shares outstanding at fiscal end) toward 1997. Full-
data requirements like this usually create a severe  survival bias;  but in the population of 
Japan's listed firms in our sample period, corporate demises are too rare to have a material 
impact. The advantages of a full-data sample is that it allows us to track more accurately the 
evolution of  the choice of  funding sources of  corpomte debt finance in Japan during the period 
of deregulation (1980s) and post-deregulation (1990s), and to use  regression analysis that 
pools various cross-sections over time. The drawback is that young firms that get listed during 
the  sample years are  excluded.  This reduces our  chances of statistically establishing the 
existence of a positively sloped part:  empirically, these new entrants tend to  have  above-
avemge MtBs as well as above-average loan ratios (results available on request). 
The financial data are defmed as follows. Loan covers both short- and long-term loans 
(JAF33, 34, 48); note that short-term bank loans (JAF33,  34) include the short-term portion of 
long-term loan. Debt is the sum ofloans, straight bonds (JAF35, 49, 50) and convertible bonds 
(JAF51}.9 We omit liability items on trade accounts, which firms usually try to balance with 
comparable assets items, and we consider only interest-rate bearing debt in our debt mix. 
Leverage is Debt divided by the book value of  total Asset. 
To make sense of our time labels, below, note that in the regressions we relate year-
end loan ratios to lagged market-to-book ratios; years are fiscal years (usually ending in March 
8Zero values are admissible, and do occur. 
~e  simply define loans as bank loans or monitored debt and bonds as public debt.  The PACAP database that 
we use does not allow us to single out non-bank loans and bonds guaranteed by banks (see a detailed discussion 
on this issue  by Anderson and Makhija,  1999).  This inevitably makes our loans-to-debt ratio  imprecise as a 
measure for the proportion of monitored debt in the total debt.  There is no  clear reason why our noisy proxy 
would be biased in favor of the non-linear specification set forth in Figure 1 and instead it tends to bias our tests 
toward insignificance and makes our tests more conservative. Debt mix and growth in Japan  7 
31); and the time label we apply to an observation refers to the fiscal year the loan ratio is 
observed.  Thus, the  1990  observation contains the March 1990  loan ratio  but the  lagged 
market-to-book ratio in 1989-the peak value as the last annual fiscal year observation before 
the stock-price collapse, end 1989 and early 1990. 
To  test whether MtB  acts  as  a proxy just for  growth-that is,  whether risk and 
normalized  current profitability are  useful  corrections or not (see footnote  5)-we also 
experiment with average realized sales growth over the past five years. Sales are data item 
INCl in the PACAP database. We  also  test for the role of the pre-1990  regulation that 
partially or wholly constrained some firms' access to the public bond market. A constrained 
firm is defined as a firm that does not meet the (time-independent) bond issuance criteria listed 
in Table 2 of  Anderson and Makhija (1999). 
In the subsections that follow,  we raise the question to what extent, and in what 
directions, the general U-function should change over time or differ across subsets of  firms 
with different corporate-governance characteristics; we list and discuss the control variables; 
and lastly we provide some details about the estimation specifications. 
3.2. Heterogeneities over time and across subsets of firms 
The  sample we  study exhibits many  heterogeneities  that may sometimes confound the 
additional hypotheses that we (and others) may wish to formulate, especially as to how the 
functional relation between the loan ratio and growth changes over time or across classes of 
firms. First and foremost, there is the  1990 stock market crash and the slump that followed, 
which is likely to have shifted the relation between borrowing choices and growth prospects. 
We also discuss other ways to subdivide the data. In this literature, specifically, keiretsu firms 
have been studied separately by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharf  stein (1993), while Anderson and 
Makhija (1999) focused on firms that had only restricted access to the public-bond market. 
•  The stock-market crash and the ensuing slump 
Over time, the cross-section of  market-to-book ratios has swollen and shrunk dramatically, in 
line with Japan's stock-market boom and bust. Table  1 provides some information on the 
distribution of  the (lagged) market-to-book ratios. While the mean value of  the lowest-glamour 
decile stays relatively stable, there is a marked variation in the upper-decile mean. In the 
"1990" data (i.e. the 1989 market-to-book data), the highest decile is 6.53, compared with an 
average of  4.29 in the bull years 1983-89, and 2.92 during the 1991-97 slump. As a result, the 
interdecile range, starting off  at an average of3.15 (viz. 4.29 - 1.14) in the roaring 80s, widens 
to 5.00 in sample-year 1990 and then shrivels by almost two thirds, to  1.87. The median's 
path is analogous-from an average of 1.8 before 1990, it balloons to 2.67 in 1990, and then 
wanes to  around  1.55  afterwards. Thus, a hypothetical firm with a steady book-to-market 
ratio of 1.50 would be classified around the 33-th percentile in the first period, demoted into a Debt mix and growth in Japan  8 
fifth-percentile pariah in the 1990 sample, and upgraded back to the median class afterwards. 
How should the  relationship between loan-ratio and  MtB  shift in light of the changing 
circumstances? 
When MtB ratios shrink, we do not expect the parameters of  the U-shape to remain 
constant, that is, with finns simply migrating from the positive-sloped section of  the V-shape 
toward the negatively sloped one. Rather, we actually expect the U-shape to narrow-down 
even faster than the range of  MtB ratios, so that more firms end up on the positive end. One 
reason is that the advantages of  bank financing cited in the literature should have become more 
prominent in the 90s: an adverse macro-environment, higher default risks and generally larger 
uncertainty all exacerbate the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. As a result, 
most of  the firms that already went for heavy bank-financing prior to the slump should have 
even more  reason to  chose loans over public debt,  despite their lower MtB  ratios. Also 
erstwhile  bond issuers  should have  become sensitive  to  the  merits  of bank financing, 
especially since, for less than top-notch firms, also the "cheap" financing via equity-linked 
bonds dried up as investors fled for quality. 
•  Keiretsu versus non-keiretsu firms 
It is well known that Japan's corporate-finance and governance structures have been rather 
different from the U.S. (see Hodder and Tschoegl, 1985, 1993; Mayer, 1988). In particular, 
Japanese banks played a much more active role in client firms'  corporate governance and 
finance. lO As a result, Japanese firms were, on average, relatively highly levered with their 
debt traditionally consisting mostly of  bank loans. 
Not surprisingly, leverage has been particularly high for "horizontal"  (i.e.  "Big-Six") 
keiretsu firms.  These groups of firms  have long been admired as  the prime exponents of 
Japan's main-bank-centered corpomte governance and fmance. With reciprocal equity holdings 
between main banks and fIrms as well as among member firms, Berglof and Perotti (1994) 
argue, the keiretsu governance and finance structure is able to  mitigate problems of both 
incentive conflicts (Jensen and Meckling,  1976) and information asymmetries (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Early studies by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990a,b, 1991) fInd that, 
thanks to their keiretsu ties, keiretsu firms had been less constrained by their internal cash 
positions, allowing them to continue their investments and growth even when short of cash. 
But later evidence suggests that this cash may not always have been used wisely. Wu, Sercu, 
and Chen (2000) fmd no evidence that, in 1974-95, keiretsu firms did enjoy any cost of  capital 
IOSee Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) for a review on the Japanese main-bank system, and Gerlach (1992), for 
the Japanese industrial groups. In a keiretsu there are long-term implicit contractual relationships among several 
banks, one of which serves as main bank. Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) point out that virtually all Japanese 
firms, keiretsu or not, have a house bank.  This is no surprise: relationship banking exists everywhere in the 
world. However, they argue that Japanese main-bank system is special in that it is more corporate-governance 
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advantage. Worse, the largest among the keiretsu firms added significantly less firm value than 
their non-keiretsu counterparts within the  same  industry (see also  Weinstein and  Yafeh, 
1998). Wu, Sercu and Chen conclude that the larger keiretsu firms have over-invested. This is 
consistent with the prediction by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) that (less arm's-length) 
centralized credit markets like Japan's suffer from the "soft-budget-constraint" problem of 
persisting with unprofitable projects.l1 
It is difficult to predict in what direction keiretsu firms should differ from non-keiretsu 
ones regarding the relation between borrowing choices and growth prospects. In terms of 
potential for rent extmction, keiretsu banks would figure rather prominently in any line-up of 
suspects: if, as empirical work suggests, such behavior already occurs in the U.S. (Houston 
and James, 1996), then it could become even more likely when, as within a keiretsu, the house 
bank is a powerful shareholder in itself or acts as a part of  a powerful group. Ceteris paribus, 
this predicts that firms should turn away from bank fmancing sooner, and return to it later, if 
and when their growth prospects improve. On the other hand, we also know that the benefits 
from relationship banking (to either lower-reputation firms  or fast-growing  ones) could 
become much larger if  bank and borrower are very much related to each other. As these forces 
work in opposite directions,  it  is not  a priori  obvious whether one should see  a more 
pronounced U-shape for keiretsu member firms, or a flatter one. 
It is actually arguable that, in the keiretsu sample, the interest is in the presence of  a 
U-shape at all, rather than in how that U-shape compares to the one for other firms. One can 
indeed doubt whether, for keiretsu firms, the arguments for the U-shape cut any ice in the first 
place. The reason is that these arguments assume an independent firm that acts its own best 
interest; in a keiretsu group, however, many decisions are taken centrally and in the interest of 
the group or its ultimate stakeholders. Stated differently, the very presence of a U-shape even 
for keiretsu firms would provide evidence that keiretsu firms did retain a sufficient degree of 
independence in their financing decisions and that, as a result, banks have been constmined in 
their rent-extraction behavior. 
•  Japan's Deregulation 
As mentioned, during the sample period Japan has gradually deregulated its financial markets. 
This process started in mid-70s, speeded up in mid-80s, and culminated in 1990 when most of 
l1Shleifer and Vishny (1997) recognize that corporations in successful market economics such as in the U.S., 
Germany and Japan have somewhat different ownership structures and hence corporate governance systems but 
available evidence cannot resoundingly tell which one of  their governance systems is the best. However, recent 
studies on Japanese ownership structure have started to unveil a dark side of Japanese governance system. For 
instance, Morek and Nakamura (1999) argue that Japanese governance practices did not assign effective control 
rights to residual claimants due to too much governance power in the hands of banks rather than shareholders. 
Consistent with this view, Morek, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) find that there is a negative relationship 
between bank ownership and firm value when bank ownership is large enough to affect corporate governance but 
not large enough to align bank interests with those of  shareholders. Debt mix and growth in Japan  10 
the original tough restrictions on bond issuance were lifted. For example, before 1983, only 
Toyota and Mitsushibi were allowed to issue unsecured corporate bonds in Japan and main 
banks usually guaranteed secured bonds. One implication is that industrial bonds issued prior 
to 1983 are economically equivalent to main-bank loans fmanced by bank-issued bonds; that 
is, pre-1983 bank-loan ratios are not what they may look at fIrst sight. 
For keiretsu groups, another important change is worth mentioning: in the late 70s, 
banks were informed that, as of 1987, their stock holdings in any individual fIrm should not 
exceed fIve percent of  that fIrm's shares outstanding. This, of  course, reduced banks' ability to 
directly control related fIrms. The weakening powers of  the main banks would suggest that if 
the V-shape is missing (or at least less pronounced) in the earlier period, then it may still 
emerge  in the  second period,  when member fIrms  start behaving more  independently. 
However, the keiretsu fIrms could look for alternative ways of  maintaining control. First, the 
erstwhile bank-held shares were placed within the group's non-fInancial corporations, thus 
becoming industrial cross-holdings. Second, the bank's degree of  direct control was, to some 
extent, re-established by shortening the time to maturity of  bank loans, i.e. by stepping up the 
frequency of borrower performance reviews, as we will see. Thus, it is again not a priori 
obvious whether so much has changed (during the sample period, at least). 
It has been conjectured that, if the benefIts from bank loans are more than wiped out 
by hold-up behavior, then the lifting of barriers to entry should prompt fIrms  to migrate 
towards the bond market (Hoshi, Kashyap  and Scharfstein 1993).  On the other hand, if 
benefits from bank fInancing outweigh costs, deregulation should produce little or no such 
shift (Anderson and Makhija 1999). We  are not fully  convinced of the validity of these 
hypotheses. First, one would expect such migration even if banks neither help nor hold-up 
their customers: when there is no genuine difference between loans and bonds, fIrms would 
still not mind using at least some bonds when the access to public debt is opened up to them. 
Thus, in itself the observation that bank loans are to some extent replaced by public debt is 
not conclusive. The same problem would have arisen if  no migration towards bond markets 
had been observed.  Indeed,  suppose that banks do  appropriate all,  or almost all, of the 
benefIts from closer lender-borrower relationships. Then their likely reaction to deregulation is 
to  moderate their hold-up behavior such that bank fInancing  remains  marginally  more 
attractive than the new alternative, the bond market. Thus, one might see little or no shift in 
the debt mix even if there is  hold-up behavior both before and after the lifting of controls. 
There is another reason why the absence of  such a shift does not necessarily provide evidence 
against hold-up behavior: the abolishing of  previous tough bond issuance regulations in 1990 
coincided with the slump and the beginning of  the recession. As we have shown, the slump 
should increase the attractions of  bank fInancing. Thus, if  after the liberalization one sees no 
migration of  erstwhile constrained fIrms towards public fInancing, this could reflect the slump 
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3.3. Control Variables 
Corporate choice  of debt type  is  related  not only to  growth prospects  and information 
problems, corporate-governance structure, and regulatory or macroeconomic shifts, but also to 
a host of other firms' characteristics. To better isolate a growth effect, we include control 
variables other than value-to-cost in our cross-sectional analysis. All  our control variables 
have  been used in Hoshi, Kashyap and  Scharfstein (1993), Houston and James (1996), 
Johnson (1997), or Anderson and Makhija (1999): 
• Size. The log firm value is a popular proxy for information, contracting and monitoring costs 
as well as credit risk. Fama (1985) argues that smaller firms are subject to more information 
asymmetry and have lower contracting costs for inside loans such as bank loans than for 
outside debt.12  Thus, smaller firms prefer bank loans. Also, Nakamura (1993) points out 
that the large firms maintain accounts with many banks, so that information production by 
banks is less effective. In contrast, smaller firms can enjoy monitoring benefits from inside 
banks'  exclusive  information on their transaction accounts.  Diamond (1991) provides 
another explanation for the preference of  larger firms to unmonitored debt: larger firms are 
on the negatively-sloped section of the demand for monitoring because they have gained 
better reputations in the market. Also economies of  scale in the issuance of  public debt favor 
large firms (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988). In general, firm size carries a weight in credit-
rating evaluation, with smaller firms being in a weaker position and, therefore, more likely to 
stay out of  the public-debt market. 
• Leverage. The debt over total-assets ratio is a proxy for the likelihood of  financial distress 
and risk of  inefficient liquidation. Firms with a higher leverage are more easily fmancially 
distressed. From Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), these firms prefer bank debt to public 
debt because public debt is likely to lead to inefficient liquidation when the firm actually 
fails to meet its obligations. 
• Fixed-asset ratio. Fixed assets over total assets acts as a proxy for collateral value and 
liquidation value. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharf  stein (1993) argue that firms with higher fixed 
asset ratio have lower information costs of issuing public debt and hence prefer bonds to 
costly bank loans. 
• Coverage and earnings volatility. The coverage ratio, that is, operating income over interest 
payment, proxies for financial health. Coverage enters our regressions as an indicator (which 
is one if  coverage falls below three, and zero otherwise), which should be positively related 
to risk. The fifth regressor is volatility of  earnings over the last five years, a proxy for both 
credit risk and precision of interim indicators. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that, for 
12This  view is further elaborated in the relationship banking literature that suggests small firms  with close 
banking ties have a better position to get access to cheaper credit (see Berger and Udell, 1995, and Peterson and 
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outsiders, fIrms operating in uncertain environments are more difficult to value. Similarly, 
Berlin and Loeys (1988) suggest that fIrms with less accurate fInancial indicators prefer bank 
loans. Thus, we hypothesize that the bank-loan ratio is positively related to both volatility 
and the "cov<3" indicator. 
• Pre-1990 constrained access to the bond market. The constrained fIrms are those that do not 
meet the bond assurance criteria listed in Table 2 of  Anderson and Makhija (1999), which 
were abolished in 1990. The dummy variable CON takes on the value of unity if  a fIrm is 
constrained and zero otherwise. 
• Year and industry factors.  All  samples containing more than one  annual cross-section 
contain dummies for the year. We also added a set of industry dummies to allow for sector 
effects. 
• Keiretsu membership. The Big-Six horizontal keiretsu are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-ichi Kangyo groups. The keiretsu fIrms in our sample either meet the 
classifIcation by Nakatani (1984), or are the closely-affIliated members (with the degree of 
the 2-, 3-, and 4-star inclination) to the Six Groups as classifIed in the 1992/93 edition of 
Industrial Groupings in Japan - the Anatomy of  the  "Keiretsu". By implication, then, our 
non-keiretsu fIrms are either the unaffiliated fIrms or the weakly related members (a I-star 
affinity to the Six Groups). 
3.4. Regression specification and econometric issues 
The control variables enter in the standard linear way. For MtB (the market-to-book ratio), 
however, we also introduce MtB squared, MtB2, to be able to capture the hypothesized U-
shape. For fIrms with constrained access to the bond market prior to 1990, we have additional 
regressors CON, CON*MtB,  and CON*MtB2. In the remainder of the paper we refer to this 
regression specification as Modell. 
As we have pointed out earlier, keiretsu membership is likely to make a substantial 
difference (see also Nakatani, 1984). We incorporate this into the estimations by introducing a 
"Model II" variant, which includes a differential intercept and interactions between a keiretsu-
membership dummy (K=1  for keiretsu firms) and the main variables of interest, MtB and 
MtB2. 
There are three econometric issues. First, one might argue that keiretsu membership is 
an endogenous variable. While economic logic does suggest that keiretsu membership should 
be an optimal response to the firm's and the industry's characteristics, we very much doubt 
whether this still is the case in our data. Keiretsu affiliation turns out to be very stable over 
time, despite the huge institutional and macro-economic upheavals over the two decades we 
study. For many firms, membership even harks back to the pre-war zaibatsu groups. Thus, 
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prevailed at the time these groups were set up, right now a firm's membership is mostly a 
matter of  historic circumstances exogenous to  current data (see also Morck, Nakamura and 
Shivdasani,2000). 
A second econometric issue is that the left-hand-side variable-bank loans as a fraction 
of total  debt-is constrained  between 0  and  1,  implying that the residuals  cannot be 
symmetrically distributed around the fitted value for all values of  the regressor. Especially the 
upper bound, unity, is  often binding. To cope with such lopsided residuals we follow the 
extant literature and adopt Tobit regressions. 
A third econometric issue is  correlation across firms and over time. When pooling 
cross-sections from different years, we allow for a common random time effect across all 
firms, by including year dummies. We also include industry dummies. In addition, we skip 
two years after each cross-section, similar to the pooling in Houston and James (1996). That 
is, when we estimate the relation for the whole 1983-97 period, we actually use only the data 
of  year 1983, 86,90,94, and 97. Likewise, when we split the whole sample into roughly equal 
subperiods, the "80s" sample contains the data of year 1983, 86, and 90, while the  "90s" 
sample consists of  the 1991,94, and 97 cross-sections. This provides a comparatively simple 
way to weaken the serial correlation in regression variables. The downside is a loss of power; 
but that makes our significant results even more convincing. 
4. The Sample and its Shifts around the Deregulation: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 describes the fmancial structures in our sample in terms of  simple averages over the 
entire period and for various subperiods. Most figures are self-explanatory, so that a brief 
discussion of  some key features suffices. For convenience we also provide, in Figure 2, time-
series plots for the leverage and bank-loan ratios. Unlike the tables (and the regression analysis 
of Section S), these plots also include the 1977-83 period where, it will be recalled, industrial 
bonds were largely main-bank loans taken off  the bank's balance sheet. 
In Panel A of  Table 2, the highest average market-to-book ratio is observed for 1983-
89, the subperiod that contains the stock-market boom. Later on, as the recession lengthens 
and the extent of the banking crisis becomes manifest, the figure slides, ending at a rather 
down-beat 1.S3  for  1994-97. The dummy variable "Public", whose average measures the 
proportion of  the firms that had public debt outstanding, peaks at O.SS for 1991-93, right after 
the pre-1990 deregulation. Afterwards the proportion drops somewhat, to 0.46, but even that 
figure remains way above the 0.37 level of  the 80s. That is, the shift of  debt away from bank 
borrowing was not just a  short-term fad.  For many of these  numbers there  are  notable 
differences between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms, as shown in Panel B and C. The former 
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average of total book assets, Total Asset, is 263 versus 118 billion Japanese Yen for 1991-93. 
It  can also be verified that keiretsu firms are more levered, have more public debt outstanding, 
and report lower coverage ratios-three ominous characteristics when entering a pronounced 
recession. 
To study the evolution over time, the time-series plots are more convenient. Figure 2 
shows the 1977-99 paths of  equally-weighted average bank-loan ratios and leverage ratios for 
three sets of firms:  the entire sample (panel A), and the keiretsu and non-keiretsu subsets 
(Panel B). We report, in fact, two bank-loan ratios: loans (i.e. total bank loans) to debt, and 
short-term loans to debt. The evolution of long-term loan to debt can, of course, be inferred 
from the distance between the other two. We start our discussion with total leverage. 
Recall that the deregulation of  corporate finance in Japan started (modestly) in the mid 
70s with the weakening of equity links between banks and industrial companies, and made a 
giant stride  in 1983  when the unsecured-bond market was opened up to  a wide class of 
companies. Not surprisingly,  in that light, the leverage ratio of a typical Japanese firm 
dropped quite markedly, from 0.65 in 1977 to about 0.5  in the late 80s. This validates, in a 
larger sample, earlier evidence by Campbell and Hamao (1995). As of  the late 80s onwards, 
leverage stabilizes but the composition of  debt keeps changing in interesting ways. As shown 
in Panel A of  Figure 2, already in 1977-82 long-term bank loans were being replaced by (some) 
bond issues and (mostly) short-term bank debt, but these initial changes remained modest. To 
the 1983 reforms, in contrast, borrowers reacted with outright alacrity: as Panel A of  Figure 2 
shows, the total loan ratio dropped substantially, from 0.9 in 1983 all the way to about 0.7 in 
the early 90s. The  1990 lifting of the remaining restrictions on bond placement-the event 
deemed to  be a watershed by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) and Anderson and 
Makhija (1999)--met with far less of a response. Actually, in the nineties we observe a 
(partial)  reversal  towards  bank loans  when,  in response  to  the  stock-market collapse 
(December  1989)  and the  Basle  rules,  banks  went  for  the  better-quality  borrowers.13 
Throughout the period, most of  the variation in the total-loan ratio apparently stems from the 
short end (albeit with a lag of  one or two years); that is, the  1983-1990-1997 debt-mix shifts 
are  largely  between bonds  (unmonitored  debt)  and  short-term loans (the  class  of debt 
providing maximal control to banks). 
Many of the above shifts become more understandable when we  study the keiretsu 
and non-keiretsu subsets separately. The plots in Panel B of  Figure 2 display the time paths 
of  average total loan ratios and average long-term loan ratios for each of  these subsets, again 
13The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy rules were introduced in 1988 as an international 
standard for banks around the world to follow.  As an important part of the deregulation of its financial system, 
Japan implemented the rules in 1993, forcing Japanese banks to raise their capital ratio that used to stay much 
lower than the BIS standard. Many believe that the BIS rules were the major catalyst to the loan problems of 
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alongside their average leverage ratios. As we already saw from Table 2, keiretsu firms had 
systematically higher leverage and public-debt ratios. Either of these phenomena is readily 
explained by a pure size effect (with keiretsu firms being larger), or closer bank ties, or both. 
Over time, however, the leverage ratios of  a typical keiretsu firm fell more rapidly: member 
corporations simply cut their overall borrowing to the (much more slowly falling) level for 
non-keiretsu companies. This differential unleveraging is probably at least partly related to 
differential debt-overhang problems. However, the keiretsu-companies' concomitant faster 
drop in the  importance of bank loans may also  indicate lower benefits from  relationship 
banking (or,  more pessimistically,  increased rent extraction by battered keiretsu banks). 
Interestingly, indeed, there seems to  be no convergence between both classes of firms re 
overall reliance on bank funding. Most ofthe post-1990 rise in aggregate bank-loan financing, 
lastly, seems to originate from non-keiretsu corporations. Thus, despite the keiretsus' glorious 
past, the flight for quality was mostly a flight to non~keiretsu companies. 
Panel B of Figure 2 reveals another interesting difference. For keiretsu firms,  the 
increased adoption of  bond fmancing in 1983-90 goes together with an even faster shedding of 
long-term bank loans. That is, keiretsu main banks actually increased their short-term intra-
group lending despite a lower overall demand for loans. We see no such effect for non-keiretsu 
firms. This evolution may have been a response, on behalf of banks, to the deregulation of 
Japan' financial system. Recall that, in the 80s, banks' direct powers of control (in terms of 
inside shareholdings) were being limited to at most five percent per firm by 1987. Thus, banks 
may have been become receptive to the higher flexibility and the increased frequency of 
borrower-performance reviews offered by short-term lending. After 1990, in contrast, it was 
among non-keiretsu fIrms that short-term debt gained importance. That, however, was another 
story: as non-keiretsu firms simultaneously increased their long-term borrowing too, what we 
see is mostly the result of  banks' flight for qUality. 
5. Cross-sectional Analysis of the Debt-Mix Choice: Empirical results 
In this section, we present the main empirical findings of  the paper: the V-shaped relationship 
and its shifts over time and governance subsets (subsection 5.1). We also examine whether and 
how other factors than corporate growth playa role in the debt mix choice (subsection 5.2). 
Our results  can explain the  seemingly contradicting fIndings  from the linear regressions 
adopted hitherto in the literature (subsection 5.3). 
5.1. Is Debt Mix a V-shaped function ofMtB? 
In Table 3 we present the results for the basic regression without keiretsu dummy (Model I). 
We note that in the Total Period column, the slopes for both MtB and its square term are 
significant (p-values < 0.000). More precisely, the slope estimate for MtB is negative while Debt mix and growth in Japan  16 
the estimated coefficient of  MtB2 is positive. Thus, the estimated relation between the weight 
of bank loans in total debt and MtB  conforms to the illustration in Figure I-a  V-shaped 
curve bottoming out in the positive domain for MtB.  Corporate interest in bank loans is 
estimated to be at its lowest, unconditionally, for a market-to-book of 3.7, well inside the 
range ofMtB ratios present in the data. 
In the remainder of the top part of Table 3 we  verify the internal validity of this 
pooled-cross-section result by looking, first, at results from two roughly equal sub-periods, 
83-90 and 91-97. We still find overwhelming evidence for a quadratic relation in each of  the 
two periods. The turning point, where the slope of estimated relative demand for banking 
services as  a function of MtB  changes from negative to positive, is somewhat lower in the 
second half of  the sample (market-to-book of  2.96, versus 3.69 in the first half). This shift of 
the turning point is normal when uncertainty rises, as argued in Section 3.2. 
To  isolate  the  stock-market peak and  to  better understand the Hoshi-Kashyap-
Scharfstein and Anderson-Makhija results, we  next single out the years  1990  and  1992, 
respectively, and re-estimate separately for (i) 1983-86-89, (ii) 1990, (iii) 1992, and (iv) 1994-
97.  In each of the pooled samples,  1983-86-89  and  1994-97 we  still  find  a very clear 
quadratic. In the single-cross-section estimations, for 1990 and 1992, however, the negative 
coefficient for MtB  is  not  unambiguously significant (p-value=0.096  in  1990)  or only 
marginally so (p-value=0.064 in 1992). To some extent, this may be due to the smaller sample 
size. But at least part of  the explanation must be the shift of  the regressor distribution. Recall, 
from our discussion in Section 3.2, in the 1990 sample the (lagged) market-to-book ratios are 
at a historic high. The result is that, while in the 1983-89 regressions 90 percent of the data 
points are in the domain with a negative estimated slope, in the 1990 sample just over half of 
the data do so. In addition, MtB has a strongly right-skewed distribution. For example, from 
Table 1 the range between the means ofdeciles 1 and 5 (where most of  the negative-sloped 
section is found) is about one-fourth the range between deciles 5 and 10 (where the positive-
sloped section is situated). Thus, with fewer and more bunched-together observations, the 
negative-sloped end of  the curve section is inevitably estimated with less precision. However, 
even in the 1990 sample the coefficient for MtB2 remains significant, thus again rejecting the 
idea that demand for bank services would be unrelated, or only linearly related, to market-to-
book. A last conclusion from this set of regressions is that the leftward shift of the turning 
point, as of 1990, is not reversed in 92 and 94-97: we still fmd it in each ofthese subsamples. 
This, as we argued in Section 3.2, is what one would expect in a severe recession. 
In Panel A of  Table 4 we use realized sales growth over the past five years instead of 
MtB. The results are very similar to, and if anything even better than, those from Table 3. In 
each and every sample (including, this time, the single-year ones) there now is a significant 
negative coefficient for growth and a significant positive coefficient for growth squared. It is 
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transformation of growth or the presence of other factors than growth. However, MtB  still 
does appear to contain information not included in past sales growth and relevant for present 
purposes and vice versa.  When we run the regressions with both of the growth proxies, as 
shown in Panel B of  Table 4 where results for control variables are suppressed, each ofthem 
is generally significant. 
As a last internal-validity check of the U-phenornenon we look at the keiretsu and 
non-keiretsu subsets separately, again across the entire sample and in each of  the two or four 
sub-periods. Thus,  we  now turn to  Model II by adding three regressors: K,  K*MtB  and 
K*MtB2 where K is  the dummy that indicates membership of the Big-Six keiretsu. The 
results are presented in Table 5.  To  save space, we  again suppress the coefficients for the 
other variables, and we show the coefficients for the keiretsu members as differentials relative 
to the non-keiretsu sample. The estimates for the non-keiretsu subsets have exactly the same 
pattern as the all-firm coefficients: (i) for all samples bar the 1990 cross-section, there is a 
significantly negative linear component and a significantly positive squared component; (ii) for 
the  1990  cross-section, the  slope of the linear part is  still correct in sign, but no  longer 
statistically unambiguous  (because  the  sample  as  a  whole  is  smaller,  there  are  fewer 
observations on the negative-sloping section, and these have low variability). As for keiretsu 
dummies, none of  them is significant in Table 5. The keiretsu results (not shown but available 
on request) are very similar to those from the other half of  the firms. We have offered possible 
explanations in Section 3.2. Specifically, the existence of  a U-shape even within the keiretsu 
subgroup of firms is consistent with the notions that (i) member firms retain a considerable 
degree of  independence in their financing decisions, and (ii), as a result, banks have taken care 
to keep any rent-extraction behavior in line with the benefits from keiretsu membership.14 
5.2. Results for the control variables 
In view of  the study by Anderson and Makhija (1999), one legitimate source of concern is 
that the positively sloped  section of the  U-shape  may have been caused by pre-1990 
regulation. Specifically, if public-debt-constrained firms tend to exhibit high growth, the 
spurious conclusion would have been that high growth increases one's preference for bank 
financing. Thus, our estimations always include a dummy CON (indicating whether or not the 
firm faces regulatory restrictions when tapping the bond market) as  a main effect and as 
interactions with Mill and Mill. In Tables 3, CON is significant for the total period as well as 
14 Wu and Xu (2001) find that the valuation information of  financial decisions by both keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
firms  was different before but looks similar after the Japanese financial deregulation.  They conclude that the 
deregulation has rendered the Japanese corporate financial policies in a more market-mediated balance regarding 
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the first half of the sample period (when the restrictions did apply), as are its interactions 
with MtB and MtB2• For constrained firms, the linear slope becomes less negative, and the 
coefficient for the squared variable less positive; in short, the U-shape is less pronounced, as 
one would expect if  the U-shape represents optimal behavior but some firms are restricted in 
their movements. When growth is measured as past average sales growth, as shown in Panel A 
of  Table 4, the interactions with CON are insignificant but the main effect is positive. In short, 
also for constrained firms there is a U-shape, but it is shifted upward and/or less pronounced, 
as one would expect. 
For the second period with MtB as growth proxy, as shown in Table 3, differences 
between formerly constrained firms and the other ones become blurred. This again seems 
exactly as what one would expect when the regulatory restrictions are lifted-until one looks 
at the separate results for 1992 and 1994-97. It appears that the blurring of the distinction, 
post 1990, is just due to a very confusing 1992: in 1994-97 the formerly constrained firms 
again behave very differently from other ones, and in the same direction as pre 1990. In the 
same vein,  the  results from  Panel  A  of Table 4  show that the  constrained firms  kept 
borrowing unambiguously more from banks even after 1990 (and, this time, also clearly so in 
1992). Even speaking algebraically rather than in terms of statistical significance, Panel A of 
Table 4 shows no evidence whatsoever that formerly restrained firms shunned bank loans 
after the liberalization, in line with the diagnosis by Anderson and Makhija (1999). Anderson 
and Makhija (1999) do not go beyond 1990 because the restrictions are lifted at that time and 
constrained firms cannot be meaningfully identified after 1990. While we do not dispute their 
logic" our tests on post-90 data are nevertheless revealing: even in late 1990s, the variable CON 
does seem to capture some crucial corporate characteristic(s) over and above our control 
variables.  Thus  we  conclude, like Anderson and Makhija, that the  pre-1990 regulatory 
restrictions were not the sole reason why these constrained firms relied so much on bank 
loans. 
Our results on the  slope estimates  for these  other control  variables are  largely 
consistent with theory (see Section 3.2) and with those found  by Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharf  stein (1993) and Anderson and Makhija (1999). The slope estimate for Logsize, a proxy 
for firm size, is always significantly negative, regardless of  specifications and sample periods. 
Because of  their lower information and contracting costs in the public market, large firms take 
more unmonitored debt into their debt mix, a result similar to the evidence for u.s. firms 
(Houston and James,  1996, and Johnson,  1997). The slope estimates for Leverage and the 
coverage dummy ("Cov<3 ") are always significantly positive regardless of  specifications and 
sample periods. That is, a higher likelihood of  financial distress means more demand for loans 
from banks (who are more flexible if  conditions turn ugly, have lower costs in acquiring and 
digesting information, and offer more privacy). The evidence on leverage and coverage is 
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assets ratio is significantly negative for the whole period regardless of specifications, as shown 
in Table 3 as well as Table 4. These results seem to be driven by the data for the 90s (p-
value=0.04, against p-value=0.29 in the 80s). A similar picture emerges for the slope estimate 
for earnings volatility: this coefficient is  significantly positive (as  expected, for the same 
reason as coverage or leverage), but only clearly so in the second half of  the period. The fact 
that in the recession years fixed assets and volatility seem to matter more, both statistically 
and economically, again indicates that banks became more choosy when the going got rough. 
5.3. What would we have concluded from a linear regression? 
As we have shown, the evidence of  non-linearity is unambiguous. So if  we now discuss results 
for a linear regression we  do  so purely to be  able to verify the results by Anderson and 
Makhija (1999) and by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) on the early 1990s cross-
sections, immediately after the liberalization. Both used linear regressions similar to  our 
"Model ill". The first paper found a significantly positive slope for all firms, the second one a 
negative one for keiretsu firms. 
In a standard linear regression over our entire sample, as shown in Table 6, there is no 
demonstrable  link (slope  for  MtB=0.009,  p=0.26).  If sufficiently tenacious to  run the 
subperiod regressions (also in Table 6), one would have noted a positive slope in the first half 
of  the period, which upon closer inspection is largely due to 1990. Interestingly, the positive 
slope persists into 1992 but turns significantly negative afterwards. When pooled for 1991-
97, the latter two positive- and negative-sloped samples produce the insignificant coefficient 
for the second subperiod in Table 6. In short, whereas the evidence for the quadratic model is 
consistent in all subsamples (apart from the easily explained half-ambiguity for one of the 
growth proxies in 1990), the linear-regression results are allover the place. 
In light of  our evidence on the non-linearity, the absence of significance here in most 
samples is like a textbook example of  positive and negative sections interfering with each other 
in a misspecified regression. The 1990 positive slope, in contrast, is the result of  the fact that, 
at the time of the stock-market peak (and unusually so), most firms were on the positively 
sloping part of the V-function rather than the other way around.i5 Thus, representing the 
peak of  the stock market, the sample picked up by Anderson and Makhija (1999) turns out to 
be rather special. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) fmd  a negative slope for keiretsu 
firms around the similar time. Keiretsu firms tended to have lower market-to-books; therefore, 
their sample was taken mostly from the negative-sloped segment of  the V-relation. 
113y  1992, stock prices has fallen substantially, but that year was again special in the sense that its turning-
point-the market-to-book ratio where demand for bank loans is at its minimum-reached an all-time low, too. Debt mix and grawth in Japan  20 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a non-linear relation regarding corporate choice between monitored 
and unmonitored debt and firm's expected growth, Mill (the market-to-book ratio). Using 
data on Japanese firms, we do find that in the lower ranges of growth, there is a significantly 
negative relation between the debt mix choice (measured by the ratio of bank loans to total 
debt) and growth, while there is a significantly positive relation in the upper-third range of 
Mill. Thus, towards both ends of the growth spectrum, firms use more monitored debt in 
their debt mix, but for distinct reasons. Firms with poor prospects (high risk relative to 
growth) rely on banks to monitor and control agency problems such as overinvestment. In 
contrast, firms  with rather exceptional growth prospects, inherently fraught with severe 
information asymmetries and high credit risk, can better communicate with banks than with 
the public market; thus, they rely on banks so as to avoid the formidable information and 
contracting costs of raising public debt. In the middle spectrum of Mill, lastly, formerly 
unglamourous stocks have (re )acquired better prospects and improved reputations, or once 
high-growth stocks have matured. To these respectable and reliable firms, intermediation by 
banks provides few benefits, and the costs of rent-extraction by banks seem to exceed the 
information and agency costs of  pubic debt. 
From our empirical evidence we conclude that there is definitely aU-shaped 
relation between the bank-loan and market-to-book ratios. The turning point, where faster 
growers start getting more interested again in bank relations, is moving, to some extent, with 
the general market-to-book distribution, except for 1990. On average-but not in 1990-most 
firms are on the negative-sloped segment. That is, for the majority of  firms, improved market-
to-book ratios go hand in hand with more arm's-length borrowing. Thus, our [mdings lend 
credibility to the combined Diamond {l991)/Sharpe (1990)/Rajan (1992) model: the very act 
of borrowing from banks reduces the relative benefits from  subsequent private funding 
(Diamond), and this, in light of the hold-up costs from bank borrowings (Sharpe, Rajan), 
pushes the firms towards the bond market. 
By the same token, our evidence as a whole does not contradict the strand of  literature 
that argues for the monitoring and control benefits (Fama, 1985, Diamond, 1984, Berlin and 
Loeys, 1988, and others). Rather, we merely contend that, for moderate-to-high Mill firms, 
such benefits seem to overwhelm the costs of  bank debt. Or, stated positively, we find that 
firms with unusually high Mill do take more bank loans in their debt mix, due to their higher 
information and contracting costs of raising public debt,  as  do firms that have too little 
glamour rather than too much. 
The U-shaped model for the relation between the debt mix and MtB can accommodate 
many existing banking and [mance theories. As our evidence shows, it holds in the early 80s, 
when Japanese regulatory restrictions on bond assurance were still binding for many firms, as Debt mix and growth in Japan  21 
well as in the mid and late 90s, when as far as regulation was concerned all fIrms were free to 
chose their debt mix. It holds for both keiretsu and non-keiretsu fIrms;  indeed, there is  no 
statistically clear difference between the two groups. One interpretation is that, even if  main 
banks may have exhibited hold-up behavior at all in their heydays, they lost that power when 
Japan's deregulation (1983,  1990) produced a more market-mediated corporate fInancial 
system. However, the absence of  a keiretsu effect even pre 1983 sugests that main banks may 
always have kept rent extraction in line with benefIts from keiretsu membership. 
In view of the pervasiveness of our evidence,  the  empirical  results  obtained  by 
Anderson and Makhija (1999)  and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993)  appear less 
contradictory than they seem at fIrst sight. These results seem to result from applying a linear 
model to a U-shaped relation, and focusing periods where the statistical weight of  the positive 
leg of  the U-shape changed drastically. In sum, our proposed non-linear model also reduces 
some of the  confusion and apparent contradiction in the empirical literature on Japanese 
corporate debt mix choice. Debt mix and growth in Japan  22 
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Table 1:  The distribution (intra-decile averages) of the market-to-book ratio 
In each year, annual market-to-book ratios, Mill, of individual Japanese firms at the end of  previous fiscal year 
t-l are sorted into decile groups and averaged within each subgroup. Dl (DlO) stands for the average of  Mill's 
in the lowest (highest) tenth of the ordered data.  This table shows the decile averages for 1983-89, 1990, and 
1991-97, respectively. The 1983-89 and 1991-97 figures are averages of  the year-by-year figures. The boldface 
figures in each row are the ones closest to 1.53, the Dl value in 1990. 
Intra-decile Avera  e of Market-to-book Ratio  Mill 
Period  D1  D2  03  D4  05  D6  07  D8  09  DlO 
1983-89  1.14  1.33  1.46  1.58  1.72  1.87  2.05  2.31  2.76  4.29 
1990  1.53  1.90  2.12  2.33  2.54  2.80  3.09  3.47  4.20  6.53 
1991-97  1.05  1.21  1.31  1.40  1.50  1.61  1.74  1.90  2.15  2.92 Debt mix and growth in Japan  28 
Table 2:  Sample description for Japanese firms from late 70s to late 90s 
This table shows annual averages of financial statement variables for all Japanese business firms  (Panel A), 
keiretsu firms (panel B), and non-keiretsu firms (panel C), during various periods. Keiretsu firms are members 
that belong to the Big Six financial groups and non-keiretsu firms are weakly affiliated or unaffiliated firms. 
Data are from the PACAP database for Japan. Firms, excluding sectors of financials (Japanese Industrial Codes 
0501-0513), utilities (0801), and communications (0705), have non-missing data reported in this table for the 
whole sample period from 1978 to 1997. Total Asset in billions of Japanese Yen is the book value of bank loan 
(PACAP data items: JAF33+JAF34+JAF48) and public debt (JAF35+JAF49+JAF50+JAF51) plus book equity 
(BAL2I) at the end of the previous fiscal year (t-I). Leverage is the sum of bank loan and public debt, Debt, 
divided by total assets. Value-to-cost ratio (MtB), a proxy for Tobin's Q, is the market value of total assets, 
which equals Debt plus market value of outstanding common stocks (MKT3 times MKT5), divided by total 
assets at the end of fiscal year t-I. Bank Loan ratio, Bank LoanJDebt, is bank loan divided by the sum of bank 
loan and public debt, Debt, at the end of  fiscal year t.  Short-term loan, St. Loan, is the book value of short-term 
bank loan (JAF33+JAF34). Long-term loan, Lt. Loan, is the book value of long-term bank loan (JAF48).  The 
other two bank loan ratios, St.  LoanlDebt and Lt. LoanlDebt, are also reported at the end of fiscal  year t. 
Coverage is  measured as operating income adjusted for depreciation charges (lNC5+JAF74) divided by total 
interest charges (JAF67) at the end of fiscal year t-I. Fixed Assets ratio is the net fixed assets (BAL  7) divided 
by total assets at the end of year t-I. Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of the percentage changes in 
operating incomes in the past five fiscal years [(INC5-INC5(-I)/INC5(-I)]. Public is a dummy variable, equal to 
one if  a firm has any public debt outstanding at the end of  year t-I. 
Panel A: All Firms  Panel B: Keiretsu Firms  Panel C: Non-keiretsu 
'78-82 '83-90 '91-93  '94-97 '78-82 '83-90 '91-93  '94-97 '78-82  '83-90 '91-93  '94-97 
No. afFirms  703  703  703  703  332  332  332  332  371  371  371  371 
Total Asset  77.80  118.8  186.1  186.5  111.9  168.4  262.7  261.0  47.20  74.50  117.6  119.8 
Levemge  0.61  0.55  0.51  0.51  0.64  0.57  0.53  0.52  0.57  0.53  0.50  0.50 
Value/cost mtio  1.46  2.17  1.87  1.53  1.49  2.23  1.89  1.59  1.44  2.12  1.86  1.48 
Bank Loan/Debt  0.93  0.81  0.70  0.74  0.92  0.78  0.66  0.69  0.95  0.84  0.74  0.79 
st. Loan/Debt  0.63  0.61  0.49  0.54  0.59  0.57  0.45  0.49  0.67  0.64  0.53  0.58 
Lt. Loan/Debt  0.30  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.33  0.21  0.21  0.20  0.27  0.20  0.21  0.21 
Covemge  3.45  4.95  5.11  8.67  2.82  4.49  4.39  7.69  4.01  5.35  5.76  9.54 
Fixed asset ratio  0.38  0.37  0.38  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.39  0.40  0.36  0.36  0.37  0.39 
Earnings a  N.A.  2.09  1.59  1.59  N.A.  2.20  1.50  1.34  N.A.  1.99  1.66  1.82 
Public  0.30  0.37  0.55  0.46  0.37  0.44  0.63  0.55  0.24  0.30  0.47  0.38 Debt mix and growth in Japan  29 
Table 3: Regression results for model I 
This table presents the regression estimation for the cross-sectional relation of debt mix choice to firm's value-
to-cost ratio (MtB) for Japanese firms.  We use a Tobit model with, as the dependent variable (restricted within 
[0, 1]) the total bank loan ratio at the end of  fiscal year t.  Cross-sectional armual data on firms are pooled across 
skipping years.  The whole sample include annual data for 1983,  86, 90, 94,  and 97, which are then split in 
roughly  equal  subsamples-the 80s  (1983,  86,  and  90)  and the 90s  (1991,  94,  and  97.  Corresponding 
explanatory variables are lagged, observed at the end of previous fiscal year t-l, and include year and industry 
dummies. Logsize is the log of total book assets. Leverage is the sum of bank loan and public debt divided by 
the total assets. MtB  is value-to-cost ratio, a proxy for Tobin's q,  or firm's growth opportunities. MtB2 is the 
square of the level.  Cov<3  is a dummy variable, which equals one if the coverage ratio is less than three and 
zero otherwise. Fixed Asset is the net fixed assets ratio. Volatility is earnings volatility.  See notes in Table 2 
for more details. P-values are provided in italic below the corresponding estimates. Estimates for  year and 
industry dummies are not reported for conciseness. "Turning point" is the value of  MtB where the relationship 
with the bank-debt ratio turns from negative to positive. 
83-97  83-90  91-97  83-89  90  92  94-97 
Intercept  2.294  2.254  2.074  2.243  1.902  1.850  2.291 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MtB  -0.157  -0.133  -0.213  -0.144  -0.073  -0.155  -0.450 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.096  0.064  0.000 
MtB2  0.021  0.018  0.036  0.Q18  0.012  0.034  0.094 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.021  0.047  0.000 
CON  -0.006  -0.021  0.076  -0.127  0.279  0.361  -0.414 
0.920  0.767  0.466  0.069  0.214  0.180  0.052 
CON*MtB  0.129  0.130  0.100  0.242  -0.049  -0.179  0.673 
0.009  0.009  0.243  0.000  0.695  0.485  0.003 
CON*MtS2  -0.Q15  -0.015  -0.018  -0.027  0.007  0.049  -0.169 
0.050  0.038  0.239  0.000  0.666  0.382  0.002 
Logsize  -0.123  -0.127  -0.111  -0.124  -0.117  -0.100  -0.111 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Leverage  0.257  0.334  0.186  0.369  0.245  0.159  0.171 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.078  0.007 
Cov<3  0.146  0.127  0.151  0.108  0.200  0.149  0.145 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Fixed Asset  -0.062  -0.040  -0.087  -0.067  0.020  -0.110  -0.079 
0.046  0.285  0.037  0.076  0.771  0.103  0.131 
Volatility  0.001  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.014 
0.122  0.344  0.006  0.327  0.078  0.832  0.001 
Turning point  3.738  3.694  2.958  4.001  3.042  2.279  2.393 
(decile)- (09)  (D6)  (D1O)  (D6)  (09)  (09) Debt mix and growth in Japan  30 
Table 4: Measuring growth by past sales growth instead ofMtB in Model I 
This table reports results of robustness check on the growth proxy using the market-to-book ratio, MtB. In 
Panel A, we replace MtB  by average annual sales growth over the past five years, Sales-growth (or simply 
Growth), in the regressions; otherwise the regression is the same as in Table 3.  In Panel B, we include both 
MtB and Sales-growth in the regressions. To save space, the coefficients of  the other regressors are suppressed in 
Panel B.  See notes in Table 3 for more details. 
Panel A: Replacing MtB with past Sales-growth 
83-97  83-90  91-97  83-89  90  92  94-97 
Intercept  2.147  2.155  1.810  2.163  1.890  1.760  1.809 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Growth  -1.200  -1.150  -1.521  -1.321  -1.810  -2.141  -1.119 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001 
Growth2  5.256  4.987  6.337  5.221  9.440  7.454  7.696 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.019  0.008 
CON  0.161  0.159  0.186  0.206  0.170  0.293  0.186 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
CON*Growth  0.315  0.181  0.318  0.176  0.981  -1.598  -0.061 
0.414  0.733  0.524  0.742  0.274  0.305  0.926 
CON*Growth2  -2.329  -2.156  -1.989  -2.659  -3.019  6.622  -3.512 
0.264  0.359  0.491  0.274  0.617  0.356  0.493 
Logsize  -0.122  -0.128  -0.107  -0.128  -0.121  -0.094  -0.107 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Leverage  0.292  0.369  0.212  0.412  0.252  0.160  0.186 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.075  0.003 
Cov<3  0.137  0.123  0.132  0.105  0.178  0.131  0.142 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Fixed Asset  -0.073  -0.Q47  -0.108  -0.079  0.010  -0.139  -0.099 
0.021  0.223  0.011  0.041  0.885  0.044  0.063 
Volatility  0.001  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.012 
0.170  0.393  0.029  0.482  0.101  0.860  0.003 
Panel B: Including Both MtB and past Sales-growth 
83-97  83-90  91-97  83-89  90  92  94-97 
Intercept  2.392  2.367  2.157  2.400  2.057  2.090  2.298 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MtB  -0.105  -0.095  -0.135  -0.080  -0.053  -0.134  -0.275 
0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.192  0.102  0.002 
MtB2  0.016  0.015  0.026  0.012  0.011  0.036  0.059 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.022  0.034  0.004 
Growth  -1.101  -1.247  -1.302  -1.502  -1.775  -2.285  -0.901 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002 
Growth2  4.654  4.960  5.207  5.401  8.852  8.081  5.617 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.020 Debt mix and grawth in Japan 
Table 5: Results for Model n 
(Keiretsu-membership interactions for MtB and MtB2) 
31 
This table presents the regression estimation for the cross-sectional relation of debt mix choice to finn's value-
to-cost ratio (MtB) for Japanese firms. We use a Tobit model with, as the dependent variable (restricted within [0, 
1]) the total bank loan ratio at the end of fiscal year t.  Cross-sectional annual data on firms are pooled across 
skipping years. The whole sample include annual data for  1983, 86, 90, 94, and 97, which are then split in 
roughly equal  subsamples-the 80s  (1983,  86, and  90)  and the  90s  (1991,  94,  and  97).  Corresponding 
explanatory variables are lagged, observed at the end of previous fiscal year t-1, and include year and industry 
dummies. Logsize is the log of total book assets. Leverage is the sum of bank loan and public debt divided by 
the total assets. MtB  is value-to-cost ratio, a proxy for Tobin's q,  or firm's MtB  opportunities. MtB2 is the 
square of the level. K is a keiretsu dummy variable, which equals one if the firm is a keiretsu member and zero 
otherwise. Cov<3 is a dummy variable, which equals one if the coverage ratio is less than 3 and zero otherwise. 
Fixed Asset is the net fixed assets ratio.  Volatility is earnings volatility. See notes in Table 2 for more details. 
P-values are provided in italic below the corresponding estimates. Estimates for year and industry dummies are 
not reported for conciseness. 
83-97  83-90  91-97  83-89  90  92  94-97 
Intercept  2.328  2.292  2.122  2.314  1.923  2.012  2.217 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MtB  -0.092  -0.073  -0.148  -0.075  -0.019  -0.146  -0.213 
0.001  0.011  0.009  0.016  0.693  0.126  0.060 
MtB2  0.014  0.012  0.027  0.011  0.007  0.035  0.044 
0.000  0.001  0.008  0.010  0.195  0.053  0.101 
K  0.031  0.114  -0.091  0.050  0.131  -0.029  0.031 
0.562  0.069  0.292  0.415  0.402  0.886  0.848 
K*MtB  -0.045  -0.077  0.030  -0.029  -0.084  -0.030  -0.104 
0.290  0.091  0.690  0.502  0.347  0.878  0.543 
K*MtB2  0.007  0.010  -0.002  0.004  0.010  0.016  0.026 
0.333  0.176  0.863  0.581  0.380  0.713  0.526 Debt mix and growth in Japan 
Table 6: Results for Model ill 
(purely linear model, i.e. MtB2 omitted) 
32 
This table presents the regression estimation for the cross-sectional relation of debt mix choice to finn's value-
to-cost ratio (MtB) for Japanese finns. We use a Tobit model with, as the dependent variable (restricted within [0, 
1]) the total bank loan ratio at the end of fiscal year t. Cross-sectional annual data on finns are pooled across 
skipping years.  The whole sample include annual data for  1983, 86, 90, 94, and 97, which are then split in 
roughly  equal  subsamples-the 80s  (1983,  86, and  90)  and the 90s  (1991,  94, and 97).  Corresponding 
explanatory variables are lagged, observed at the end of previous fiscal year t-l, and include year and industry 
dummies. Logsize is the log of total book assets. Leverage is the sum of bank loan and public debt divided by 
the total assets. MtB is value-to-cost ratio, a proxy for Tobin's q, or firm's growth opportunities. Cov<3  is a 
dummy variable, which equals one if the coverage ratio is less than three and zero otherwise. Fixed Asset is the 
net fixed assets ratio.  Volatility is  earnings volatility. See notes in Table 2 for more details.  P-values are 
provided in italic below the corresponding estimates. Estimates for year and industry dummies are not reported for 
conciseness. 
total  two suberiods  Isolating the years 1990 and 1992 
1983-98  1983-90  1991-97  1983-89  1990  1992  1994-97 
Intercept  2.219  2.166  1.961  2.219  1.771  1.821  2.112 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MtB  0.009  0,015  0.006  0.000  0.037  0.039  -0.043 
0.263  0.056  0.625  0.985  0.001  0.075  0.067 
Logsize  -0.140  -0.141  -0.132  -0.145  -0.131  -0.122  -0.132 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Leverage  0.404  0.473  0.354  0.517  0.438  0.337  0.308 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cov<3  0.174  0.160  0.175  0.155  0.234  0.177  0.168 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Fixed Asset  -0.057  -0.031  -0.085  -0.054  0.036  -0.094  -0.092 
0.070  0.419  0.045  0.161  0.604  0.164  0.085 
Volatility  0.001  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.004  0.001  0.013 
0.079  0.253  0.004  0.333  0.025  0.627  0.001 
Obs.  3515  2109  2109  2109  703  703  1406 Debt mix and growth in Japan  33 
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Figure 2: Bank Loan Ratios and Leverage of Japanese Corporations for 1977-97 
Panel A: Japanese Firms Excluding Financials, Utilities, and Telecommunications 
--Total LoanlDebt 
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